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## Africa Review

6 April 1979

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AFRICA REVIEW (U)

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Zambia: Coping With the Guerrillas (U)

In recent weeks, Zambian President Kaunda has taken several steps to limit the size of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) forces in his country. Although there are no signs Kaunda is wavering in his support of ZAPU or its leader Joshua Nkomo, he is concerned that the group's growing presence will make his country increasingly susceptible to Rhodesian attack, further aggravate tensions within his defense forces, and add to the growing popular resentment of the guerrillas. (S NF NC OC)

Last month Kaunda denied Botswana permission to airlift some 9,000 military-aged ZAPU recruits from refugee camps in Botswana to Zambia in part because he was concerned the aircraft might be shot down by the Rhodesians or attacked on the ground in Lusaka. The Rhodesians threatened to take such action against a similar airlift in February, and as a result, the airlift was suspended after some 3,200 recruits were transported to Lusaka. The Rhodesians subsequently attacked the recruits' staging area in Zambia. Kaunda also is concerned that a continuing influx of ZAPU recruits will further aggravate Zambia's economic and security problems and increasingly threaten the government's ability to maintain law and order. (S)

Kaunda has instructed the Zambian military to cooperate fully with ZAPU efforts to outfit, transport, and infiltrate large numbers of guerrillas into Rhodesia to disrupt the coming election. The Zambians have set up special coordinating committees in every military district to facilitate the rapid movement of thousands of guerrillas to the Rhodesian border, and the military has agreed to assist ZAPU in defending these forces against anticipated Rhodesian attacks. In the past, the Zambians provided only logistical support, transportation, and some training to the ZAPU guerrillas. (S NF NC OC)

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The Zambians' inability to defend themselves against Rhodesian air attacks has created frictions between Zambian Army and Air Force officers. Army officers claim that the Air Force is unwilling to risk lives or equipment to repel Rhodesian air attacks. Air Force officers maintain that the Army is trying to cover up its inability to counter the Rhodesians effectively on the ground. Such frictions reportedly are hampering efforts to coordinate their defenses. (S NF NC OC)

Late last month, relations between the two services were even further strained when it was reported that a Zambian jet fighter was shot down by a Zambian artillery regiment as it was making its approach at Livingstone airport. The Air Force maintains it sent Zambian and ZAPU units in the area the standard signal advising them of the flight. Some have suggested, however, that the plane might have been brought down by the Rhodesians after it was intentionally sent across the border to test Rhodesian air defense capabilities. (S NF NC OC)

The substantial ZAPU presence in Zambia has also become a public hazard. As a result of recent Rhodesian raids, many guerrillas have become increasingly trigger-happy when coming in contact with "suspected Rhodesian spies"--particularly white farmers. As the Rhodesians increase the number and accuracy of their raids, many black Zambians have also come to suspect their white neighbors as spies, leading to a general deterioration in race relations. (C)

A large number of guerrillas have deserted their camps, and as a result the number of attacks on white and black Zambians in rural areas has increased significantly in recent months. Zambian journalists and politicians have increasingly criticized such lawlessness, but there is little Zambian authorities or ZAPU leaders can do to control the renegade guerrillas. On those occasions when the police have arrested guerrillas for specific violations of the law, ZAPU leaders have protested. They want the dissident guerrillas turned over to them for disciplinary action, but the police often have resisted such requests. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NO-FORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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South Africa: Increasing Alienation of Urban Blacks (U)

The South African police have recently stepped up the harassment and intimidation of Soweto residents, and some local leaders believe that a new violent confrontation may be developing between young people and the police. Soweto, the black township of over 1.5 million on the outskirts of Johannesburg, was the focal point of riots that swept South Africa nearly three years ago. (C)

Bishop Desmond Tutu, the black secretary general of the South African Council of Churches who warned the government in the spring of 1976 of impending violence in Soweto, believes that the hectoring methods used by the police to enforce the pass laws that control blacks in white areas of South Africa are again raising the level of hatred and bitterness in blacks to a point that could lead to violence and bloodshed. At a recent press conference the Bishop urged senior South African Cabinet and security officials to halt the intensified security sweeps before blacks become more radicalized. (C)

Privately, Bishop Tutu speculates that the police may be deliberately provoking the Soweto community to cause confrontations that will ferret out some of the more radical Marxist-oriented youths whom they believe have infiltrated the township during the past year. The Bishop believes that growing numbers of young South African blacks are turning to Marxist theory, although he is not sure if those who have recently arrived in Soweto have any connection with the exiled African National Congress, the main South African liberation group. (C)

Sheena Duncan, head of the Black Sash, the white volunteer organization that provides legal aid to blacks who run afoul of the pass laws, has confirmed that the Soweto police have recently doubled the number of arrests for infractions of the influx control regulations. Duncan has a unique perspective on this situation as she has spent most of her life working for the Black Sash, which her mother founded. Duncan believes that the October

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1977 government security crackdown on moderate black leaders and organizations has convinced young residents of Soweto that nonviolent opposition to the government is futile. She thinks that the black consciousness movement is losing its relevance among young urban blacks because of its basically passive philosophy. (C)

The leading moderate spokesman for Soweto, Dr. Ntatho Motlana, has surmised that the government is probably trying to intimidate and humiliate what he characterizes as the "spirit of revolt" in the black community. Motlana concedes, however, that the pass raids are also intended to clamp down on urban terrorists. (C)

The police are making no secret about mounting searches for those without proper documentation. They often give advance notice of roadblocks, thus allowing would-be terrorists or guerrillas to evade them. This practice lends credence to another theory that the government may be trying to find as many illegal sojourners as possible in Soweto. Up to half of the township's population may not have the proper documentation for residence there, and shipping them back to the "homelands" provides an easy way to cut the high employment rate and relieve Soweto's severe housing shortage. (C)

All of these reasons have undoubtedly contributed to the government decision to police Soweto so heavily; whatever the basic intention, the result will be to further embitter urban blacks. Tensions in Soweto do not appear to have reached the level that precipitated the violence three years ago, although the black community is visibly disturbed by the police actions. (C)

The situation at present in Soweto underscores the basic contradiction in South Africa's domestic policy. On the one hand, the government regularly proclaims to black leaders that new consultation programs are being developed so that white government leaders can make policies with blacks rather than for blacks; on the other hand, the actions of the security forces are further alienating the black community, particularly the young, and thereby destroying any hope for developing common interests between blacks and whites. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Zaire: Government Changes (U)

Mobutu's 6 March Cabinet shuffle came at a time of growing domestic and international speculation that the President was in danger of losing effective control of the country. The shakeup may have been designed to counter such speculation by portraying Mobutu as a firm executive still in control of Zaire's political machinery. In any event, it is unlikely to help Mobutu come to grips with the country's serious social, political, and economic problems nor does it portend great changes in Zaire's relations with its Western donors. (S)

Perhaps the most significant change was the rehabilitation and reinstatement of Nguza Karl-I-Bond as Foreign Minister. In late 1977 he was found guilty of knowing about, and failing to report, rebel plans for the 1977 Shaba invasion and was sentenced to death for high treason. (The sentence was later suspended.) The President probably engineered Nguza's temporary political demise in order to undercut his popularity and remove a political rival.\* Nguza's reappointment as Foreign Minister is probably an effort by Mobutu to



Nguza Karl-I-Bond, Foreign Minister (Unclassified)

\*Nguza, a Shaban and a member of one of the Lunda royal families, was once seen as the man most likely to succeed Mobutu.

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woo Western donors. Nguza is widely respected among Zairians and expatriates for his considerable talent, and he will be a welcome change from his apparently less competent predecessor. Nguza probably is chastened by his personal and political ordeal, however, and is unlikely to be as dynamic and effective as he was in the past. (C)

Mobutu said publicly that he had rehabilitated Nguza because he was impressed by his humility and sincere repentance. Mobutu probably hopes the rehabilitation of Nguza and the appointment of another Shaban, Kibassa Maliba, as Minister of Sports and Leisure, will help ease the strain between Shaba and his regime. Most Shabans, however, are more interested in greater economic attention from Kinshasa than in Nguza's return, and it is doubtful that they will see it as a pro-Shaba move. Moreover, Kibassa's portfolio is not a very promising spot

from which significantly to improve relations between Kinshasa and Shaba. Some Shabans were moved to make sarcastic comments about the utility of having any Minister of Sports and Leisure in a country with Zaire's problems. (C)



Bo-Boliko Lokonga, Prime Minister (Unclassified)

#### Political Manipulation

The selection of Bo-Boliko Lokonga as Prime Minister in the recent shakeup illustrates Mobutu's skill at political manipulation. Bo-Boliko is more highly respected and competent than his predecessor, but the post is probably largely honorific. Mobutu assured him he would have wide authority and that Mobutu would withdraw to his estate Gbadolite for six months a year, but Bo-Boliko remains unconvinced. (C)

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By appointing Bo-Boliko, a longtime critic of government corruption and leader of the Legislative Council, Mobutu can appear to be liberalizing his regime while simultaneously co-opting a critic. Bo-Boliko has strong labor support and still exerts considerable influence over the labor movement. Mobutu, always wary of potential rivals, may be trying to neutralize Bo-Boliko's considerable political talents and at the same time have in place a useful scapegoat should the country's economic and political deterioration continue unabated. (C)

### The Legislature

The selection of Ileo Songo Amba to replace Bo-Boliko as President of the Legislative Council was probably intended to weaken that body. Ileo, who is Permanent Secretary and spokesman of the Political Bureau, is honest and intelligent, but he is not as aggressive as Bo-Boliko and prefers to remain in the background. (C)

Over the past year, Zaire's Legislative Council has become increasingly vocal in its criticism of the regime. Several members of the Council have provoked confrontations with the President, and it has become the focal point of opposition to the Mobutu government. The body's interpellation of ministers has encouraged those who would like to see Zaire move toward a more parliamentary government. Mobutu has recently become increasingly annoyed with the legislature because it has gone so far as to imply criticism of Mobutu himself. (S)



Ileo Songo Amba President, Legislative Council  
(Unclassified)

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Impact on the Economy

One potentially significant change in the economic hierarchy was the appointment of Sambwa Pida Nbagui as deputy director of the Presidency. Sambwa was dismissed from his position as governor of the Bank of Zaire in 1977 for having argued too forcefully in favor of strict controls over government spending. If Sambwa is allowed freedom of action, the International Monetary Fund may be able to count on more effective support from the Presidency in its attempt to bring economic reform to Zaire. (S)

Other shifts in the economic sphere--shuffling portfolios at the Bank of Zaire and the Ministries of Finance, Energy, Land Affairs, and Labor--appear to be little more than another turn of the political carousel. The shift of Bofossa W'amb'ea Nkose from the Bank of Zaire to the Finance Ministry could facilitate the work of the UN Development Program comptroller and the Belgian customs team expected to work there. Bofossa's replacement at the Bank, Emony Mondaga, might be less amenable to cooperation with Erwin Blumenthal, the expatriate bank director. (C)

The General Security Council

In another move on 6 March, Mobutu created the General Security Council and placed it under his direct control. The organization apparently is charged with centralizing and reviewing all information relative to the security of Zaire, and recommending new security measures. Any decisions the council makes will be enforced only after presidential concurrence. (U)

The council will be headed by Seti Yale, the former head of the National Documentation Center, Zaire's security organization. The council comprises almost all agencies involved in national defense and security. Four of the eight council members are from Mobutu's home region of Equateur, continuing a recent trend toward greater reliance by Mobutu on members of his own and neighboring regions to fill key national security positions. (S)

The creation of the security council suggests that Mobutu is increasingly concerned about the vulnerability

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of his regime. The President apparently believes that the United States and other Western governments are willing to provide an advantage to his opponents by not informing him of their activities in a timely fashion. On two separate occasions when US representatives provided Zairian officials with information on potentially destabilizing activities of Mobutu's opponents, the Zairians were already aware of the information. These incidents may have added to Mobutu's suspicions that the United States was hedging its support for Mobutu. (S) (SECRET)

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Central African Empire: Growing Troubles for Bokassa (U)

Emperor Bokassa, Chief of State of the Central African Empire, faces growing opposition to his regime. Disaffected troops reportedly launched an abortive coup on 25 March at the Emperor's palace in Berengo. A day later in Berberati, approximately 100 miles west of the capital of Bangui, antiregime riots broke out and demands were made for the Emperor's abdication. (S NF NC OC)

Government officials believe the abortive attempt in Berengo was mounted by military leaders loyal to Colonel Sylvester Yangongo, who was arrested in mid-March on charges of plotting to oust Bokassa. Although Bokassa maintained the loyalty of his military establishment during antigovernment disturbances last January, the activities of Yangongo and his cronies suggest that the Emperor's grip on the country's security forces may be weakening. (S NF NC OC)

The Army reportedly is now dissatisfied with Bokassa's failure to implement promised military reforms and pay increases. The military, along with other important segments of the population, also deeply resents the decline in urban living standards that has resulted, in part, from the Emperor's extravagance. (S NF NC OC)


Significantly, Bokassa, who will probably face more serious opposition in the months ahead, will be forced to rely increasingly on the military to suppress major challenges to his rule. The violent antigovernment disturbances in Bangui last January brought sharply into focus the regime's precarious position and may encourage Central Africans to defy the Emperor and register their dissatisfaction. Given the public mood, widespread demonstrations could be sparked by even a minor incident. (S)

As Bokassa's military support seems to be weakening, it is unlikely he can count on his traditional foreign backers in a crisis. The French, unhappy with Bokassa's unpredictable rule, which they view as precarious and

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confronted with almost universal opposition, are becoming increasingly reluctant to bail him out. Zairian President Mobutu is also upset with Bokassa for publicizing unsubstantiated reports that Zaire dispatched troops to support the Emperor during the January riots.  
(S) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Zanzibar-Tanzania: What Fate for Jumbe? (U)

For the past several years Tanzanian President Nyerere has hinted that he would like to step down from the presidency and devote himself to party affairs and ideology. Nyerere's plans are still unclear, but it is unlikely that he would step down before the elections in 1980. Although there is no designated successor, Vice President Aboud Jumbe, a native of Zanzibar, has generally been regarded as the heir apparent in the event of Nyerere's death or resignation. Jumbe, however, has so far generated little popular enthusiasm on the mainland, and his standing on Zanzibar is becoming increasingly shaky. Zanzibaris now see him as willing to give in to Nyerere's determination to eliminate Zanzibar's distinctiveness from the mainland. (U)



Aboud Jumbe presenting membership cards to new Party members at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in Dar es Salaam. As Party Vice President, Jumbe is involved in Party politics, but his press coverage is limited and suggests that his role is primarily ceremonial. (Unclassified)

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Because of Tanzania's electoral process, Jumbe's chances of becoming President are less dependent on his regional political base than on his popularity within the Revolutionary Party (CCM) and among the voters.\* If Nyerere steps aside in 1980, the Tanzanian constitution provides that an electoral conference of the CCM must convene to select a single candidate to replace him. In Jumbe's case, the mainland-dominated CCM would be more inclined to choose another mainlander, unless Nyerere chose to use his influence to ensure Jumbe's succession. In any case, the nominee is subject to a "yes" or "no" vote from the voters, the vast majority of whom are mainlanders. If the nominee does not receive a majority of positive votes, the Electoral Conference must choose another candidate. (U)

Jumbe's standing with the CCM may be slipping. He was absent from the political scene between early September 1978 and January 1979, ostensibly for medical treatment. Since his return, media coverage of his activities has emphasized the ceremonial rather than the political aspects of his position. At the same time, coverage of Prime Minister Edward Sokoine and Minister of Defense Rashidi Kawana has increased.\*\* (C)

Although Jumbe is chairman of the Revolutionary Council on Zanzibar, he spends much of his time on the mainland and leads Tanzanian delegations to international meetings and state visits. Since the Revolutionary Council has no deputy chairman, the Zanzibari government barely functions during Jumbe's frequent absences. Zanzibaris resent this inattention to the island's affairs and blame it for many of their chronic problems, particularly food shortages. Commodity prices continue

\*In February 1977, Nyerere's Tanganyika African Union (TANU) and Jumbe's smaller Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) merged to form the Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapunduzi--CCM). (U)

\*\*Kawawa was once considered Nyerere's logical successor, but gradually lost ground to Jumbe. In Nyerere's Cabinet shuffle in February 1977 Kawawa's position of Second Vice President was abolished, and he was replaced as Prime Minister by former Defense Minister Sokoine. (U)

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to climb, incomes remain low, and Zanzibar's separate foreign reserves are seriously depleted. In a rare meeting with Zanzibari ministers and officials last December, Jumbe threatened to dismiss them if the local economic situation did not improve. He also sparked resentment among the population by announcing that the island's economy would be incorporated with that of the mainland when Zanzibar's three-year plan expires in 1981. This coincides with the expiration date of Tanzania's five-year plan. (S NF NC OC)

Last summer dissatisfaction over Jumbe's leadership was so great that Zanzibari military leaders were discussing ways to remove him from office. In addition, the military resent the way he has dismissed or sent to the mainland talented Zanzibari leaders and forced Zanzibaris to contribute to Tanzania's military effort in Uganda. Public criticism of Jumbe is now widespread. (S NF NC OC)

Nyerere favors having a Zanzibari vice president as a symbol of a united republic, but in light of Jumbe's poor standing with the CCM and the voting population and his declining popularity on Zanzibar, Nyerere may not endorse Jumbe to become the next President of Tanzania. Even if the Revolutionary Party did choose Jumbe as the presidential candidate and the voters approved, he would not enjoy the trust or supply the strong personal leadership that Nyerere does. (U) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Ethiopia: Status of the Eritrean Movements (U)

Since the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) reaffirmed last January their intention to unite, neither group has made much progress on the national level toward achieving this goal. Limited cooperation on the local level within Eritrea continues, although it is hampered by a lack of guidance from the national leadership. The inability of the leaders to achieve unity continues to fuel dissatisfaction among ELF and EPLF forces and supporters within Eritrea. (S NF NC OC)

Ahmed Mohammed Nasser, leader of the ELF, blamed the lack of progress toward unification on the more Marxist EPLF, whose leaders failed to return to Eritrea from Khartoum to work out the details of the agreement with their followers. The EPLF, on the other hand, has criticized the ELF's lack of military support and co-operation during recent Ethiopian attacks. The constant squabbling among the leaders continues to adversely affect the troops in the field. Resentment toward the leadership of both guerrilla movements may lead to moves to unseat them. (S NF NC OC)

Despite the problems between leaders of the ELF and EPLF, limited military cooperation has occurred between their respective forces in Eritrea. ELF units located near EPLF areas of operation, particularly around the town of Nakfa, have been providing rear-guard support, releasing EPLF units for deployment to other areas. Both sides have also been sharing supply routes into Eritrea from Sudan. (S NF NC OC)

The third Eritrean liberation movement, the small Eritrean Liberation Front/Popular Liberation Forces (ELF/PLF), is presently troubled by a leadership struggle. In late March, pro-Iraqi members of the organization's Central Committee launched a tribally-based coup attempt to oust the moderate leader, Osman Saleh Sabbe. The dissident elements--apparently with Iraqi support--

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were prepared to pursue a merger with the ELF, which had been rejected by Sabbe. At present Sabbe appears to have blunted the efforts of the dissidents, primarily as a result of help from the Sudanese, who have denied the rebels access to ELF/PLF facilities. The Sudanese have no desire for fighting on their territory and do not want the Eritreans to become further fragmented. Khartoum also realizes that, although Sabbe may be difficult at times, he is an important moderate Eritrean leader who must be dealt with. (S NF NC OC)

Continuing internal troubles have contributed to the ELF's decline as a major Eritrean movement. Since January, the 15,000-man ELF regular force has been reduced by defections, casualties, and low morale to a total of 10,000 to 12,000, augmented by a 12,000- to 15,000-man militia. Despite its problems, the ELF remains active in the Eritrea-Sudan border area, keeping the Ethiopians bottled up in the population centers; ELF forces have downed several transport aircraft with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. Its forces have also been active around Asmara, the provincial capital, and along supply routes south of the city. (S NF NC OC)

The EPLF, with approximately 25,000 armed regulars, has successfully defended Makfa and Karora--the last towns held by the insurgents--against repeated heavy government attacks. According to a number of reports, they have inflicted heavy losses on the Ethiopians, both in men and equipment. Although most of the EPLF forces engaged in the fighting have resigned themselves to the eventual loss of Nakfa and Karora, morale is high and they remain committed to the Eritrean cause. In an effort to weaken Ethiopian morale and disrupt supply lines, a number of successful attacks have been conducted against Ethiopian outposts and positions around Keren, Asmara, and Nakfa. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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RHODESIA: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY (U)  
(16-31 March 1979)

- 16 March                    A Zambian jet fighter is reportedly accidentally shot down by Zambian antiaircraft artillery near Livingstone, further aggravating relations between the Army and Air Force.  
25X1C                    [REDACTED] suggests, however, that the plane might have been brought down by the Rhodesians after it was intentionally sent across the border to test Rhodesian air defense capabilities. (S NF NC OC)
- 16-17 March               Rhodesian aircraft launch their third and fourth attacks into Mozambique within a week, the first striking at a large munition depot near Dondo, about 40 kilometers north of Beira, and the second hitting a ZANU camp near Chimoio. (U)
- 16-29 March               Prime Minister Ian Smith visits South Africa and receives an honorary degree in Cape Town. Smith meets [REDACTED] on 25 March with South African Prime Minister Botha [REDACTED]  
25X1C                    [REDACTED] Botha reportedly also offers Rhodesian assistance to ensure the new government's survival. (S NF NC OC)
- 25X1C                    25X1C                    25X1C

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17 March

Secretary of State Vance and UK Foreign Secretary Owen issue formal statements calling on the Rhodesian Government to agree to UN-supervised elections as a precondition for lifting sanctions. ZAPU leader Nkomo strongly denounces the new initiative; Prime Minister Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, and Reverend Sithole later reject the statements. Only Chief Chirau reacts positively, supporting an immediate all-party conference.  
(U)

The Rhodesian Government announces amnesty for guerrillas who defect before the election, allowing them to keep their arms. About 1 million leaflets announcing the program will be dropped from airplanes over areas where the guerrillas are known to be operating. (U)

Zambian President Kaunda denies Botswana permission to airlift some 9,000 ZAPU recruits from refugee camps in Botswana to Lusaka in part because he is concerned the Rhodesians might shoot the plane down or attack it on the ground in Lusaka. Kaunda is also concerned about the economic and security burdens such an influx of recruits would pose for Zambia. (C)

20-26 March

ZAPU leader Nkomo continues his West African tour soliciting support from the leaders of Sierra Leone, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Cameroon. Senegal's President Senghor gives him permission to open an office in Dakar and agrees to provide some training for ZAPU personnel. (C)

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23 March

A major oil depot just outside of Beira, Mozambique is attacked, causing about \$3 million in damage. The electrical supply line to Beira is also cut, but power is restored later in the day. The Mozambique National Resistance Movement claims responsibility for the attacks; the Mozambique Government initially attributes the attacks only to "the enemy," but later states that Rhodesian saboteurs are responsible.  
(U)

The Executive Council makes Prime Minister Ian Smith Grand Commander of the Order of the Legion of Merit--the country's highest civilian decoration. Rhodesian officials say the granting of the award is not an indication of Smith's imminent retirement. (U)

28 March

The Rhodesian Government issues official emigration figures showing a net loss of 592 whites in February--compared with 1,073 in January. This is the smallest loss since March 1978, when 471 whites departed. White emigration rose dramatically last fall, peaking at 2,771 net departures in December, but most whites now are willing to wait and see whether the new government is likely to survive.  
(U)

Reverend Sithole calls for an all-party conference to end the guerrilla war. He doubts Bishop Muzorewa will give him a post in the new government and may be seeking to improve his standing with ZAPU leader Nkomo.  
(S)

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31 March

Guerrillas derail a train carrying Zambian copper en route to South Africa at Plumtree, near the Botswana border. It is the worst incident on the line since Zambia re-opened the southern route last October. (U)

Zambian defense forces and ZAPU go on 24-hour alert at the end of the month in anticipation of major Rhodesian air and ground attacks against ZAPU guerrillas massing in southern Zambia for infiltration into Rhodesia to disrupt the election.  
(S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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FOR THE RECORD (U)

GHANA: Plans by the military to return Ghana to civilian rule in July may be deferred until next January. Representatives of most of the country's 16 recently formed political parties met last week with Head of State General Akuffo and asked that the scheduled transfer of power be delayed for six months. The present timetable calls for civilian presidential and parliamentary elections to be held on 18 June, but party leaders maintain that more time is needed to select candidates for public office, raise election funds, and organize campaigns. Although General Akuffo took no action, he left the door open for postponement of civilian rule at the request of the constituent assembly, a partly-elected representative body that is supposed to complete its review of the country's civilian constitution by mid-April. (C)

The regime believes it cannot unilaterally defer civilian government without opening itself to charges of trying to perpetuate military rule. The July turnover was set by the Akuffo government last summer shortly after it ousted unpopular junta leader General Acheampong. After six years of military misrule under Acheampong, the populace probably favors a swift return to civilian government. A six-month postponement of civilian rule would enhance the prospects of stringent economic recovery measures instituted by the Akuffo government which, under a civilian administration, will be more vulnerable to interest group pressure. The electorate would also have more time to familiarize itself with Ghana's emerging civilian politicians and constitutional structure. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL) [REDACTED] /OPA, 25X1A

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NIGERIA: Head of State General Obasanjo reportedly stated during his annual budget message on 31 March that national elections leading to civilian rule next October will be held sometime between July and September. This is the first official pronouncement on the timing of elections, although the dates and sequence of the elections have yet to be determined by the ruling military council. Late last month the federal electoral commission publicly affirmed its plans to hold five separate

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elections over a period of five to seven weeks. The contests--not necessarily in this order--would be for state legislative assemblies, state governors, the federal house of representatives, the federal senate, and the federal presidency. The final voter register totals some 48.3 million voters. The regime had hoped to hold elections this spring, but the timing has slipped primarily because of logistics shortcomings on the part of the federal electoral commission. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Rhodesia: Looking Beyond the April Election (U)\*

The election later this month of a black-led government of national unity in Rhodesia will bring substantial pressure on the United States and United Kingdom to recognize the new government and lift economic sanctions. The Rhodesians will make an all-out effort to ensure adequate security and a large turnout for the election. Although the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union will try to disrupt the election, neither guerrilla group will be able to prevent it from taking place. (S)

Bishop Muzorewa is the most likely candidate to emerge as the head of the new government. He will seek to consolidate his position by strengthening his relationship with the whites, establishing greater control over the countryside, and inducing defections from ZANU and ZAPU. He may try to split the guerrillas further by offering to strike a separate deal with ZANU or ZAPU. We doubt, however, that the white leaders will show enough flexibility to allow Muzorewa to propose a deal acceptable to either guerrilla leader. (S)

The election of a new government, coupled with a continuation of the fighting, will create some hard choices for those states most closely involved with the Rhodesian problem. The frontline states will continue to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could force some presidents into an open-ended commitment to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence in their countries. The frontline states might also have to consider the possibility of supporting one guerrilla group against the other in the event of a civil war. (U)

\*These key judgments are taken from Rhodesia: Looking Beyond the April Election, PA 79-10172, April 1979. A copy of the assessment may be obtained from the author. (U)

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If the Soviets and the Cubans continue to favor ZAPU over ZANU, they risk alienating Tanzania and Mozambique, which would like to see more support given to ZANU. If they agree to support both groups, however, they could become involved in a civil war. If Nkomo makes a separate deal with the Salisbury government, they might find themselves forced to throw their support behind ZANU. (U)

The United States and United Kingdom must decide whether to recognize the newly elected government and lift economic sanctions. A positive decision would strengthen the position of the new government, but provoke a hostile reaction from black African leaders outside Rhodesia. A negative decision would undercut the viability of the new regime, but not deter the frontline states from supporting further efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. (U)

Rhodesia is not likely to be a major issue in the impending British election campaign, given the paramountcy of domestic concerns and the reluctance of the Conservative Party to commit itself prematurely to any set policy. The Conservatives, who stand a good chance of coming to power, would prefer not to get out in front of the United States on this issue, and--at least initially--are not likely to announce dramatic departures from current government policy. There will be mounting pressure within the party, however, to give at least tacit recognition to the internal regime and to lift sanctions--particularly by November when sanctions come up for renewal in Parliament. A Tory government might be emboldened to act sooner if Congress voted to lift US sanctions, Prime Minister Smith stepped down, Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa increased markedly, or there was a major escalation of the fighting. (S NF)

Prospects for a successful all-parties conference or agreement on the part of the internal government to UN-sponsored elections are dim. Short-term prospects are for a continuation of the stalemate, particularly now that South Africa has promised to provide support to the new government. The fighting certainly will continue, providing expanding opportunities for the Soviets and the Cubans. (S NF) (SECRET NOFORN)

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Somalia: Shift in Tactics in the Ogaden (U)\*

The Somali Government has recently reduced its military support to the guerrilla forces in Ethiopia's Ogaden region to meet conditions laid down by the United States and other Western countries for badly needed arms support. It is clear, however, that President Siad Barre has not renounced Somalia's extraterritorial claims on its neighbors, but is only lowering the level of conflict until its armed forces are rebuilt. Once this has been achieved, Siad will be in a position to resume the struggle to unify the Somali people. (S NF NC OC)

In making this tactical shift, Siad reportedly has the support of his military and the agreement of the insurgent leadership. This lessens greatly the possibility of an adverse reaction from the armed forces. Siad has maintained his control over the guerrillas, covered his tracks at home, and is prepared to increase military support to the insurgents when he believes the timing is right. In spite of periodic tactical shifts, one of the key goals of Mogadiscio's national policy will continue to be unification of the Somali people by whatever means necessary. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

\*These key judgments are taken from Somalia: Shift in Tactics in the Ogaden, RP 79-10165, March 1979. A copy of the assessment may be obtained from the author. (U)

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